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Abstract 
For small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), R&D 
cooperation with sources of external knowledge is be-
coming increasingly essential for fostering innovation 
activities. This paper investigates the effects of collabo-
ration on innovation by considering four different part-
ner types: competitors, customers, suppliers, Universi-
ties and Government laboratories. Using firm-level data 
from the Community Innovation Survey for the years 
2006-2008 (CIS 2008) and applying a Heckman probit 
model with sample selection, we analyse the determi-
nants of cooperation and innovation probabilities for 
each type of partner. Results show that internal and ex-
ternal R&D acquisitions, public financial support, as 
well as belonging to a scientific sector or to a business 
group are significant determinants of the partners’ 
choice for collaboration, although with different magni-
tude across various types of collaborations.  
JEL classification: O32; L24 
Keywords: cooperation; innovation; discrete choice; 
sample selection bias.  
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1 - Introduction 
 
Social capital theory has been used to analyse the internal and exter-
nal networks in organizations (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Leend-
ers and Gabbay, 2001) and during the last decade, it has been applied 
to technological innovation and inter-organizational cooperation at a 
firm level. In fact, in the knowledge economy, when globalization 
processes induce firms to face strong competitive pressure, it is no 
longer sufficient to rely on in-house innovation. Making “permeable 
the borders of the firm” is becoming more and more important. 
Therefore, firms should acquire and exploit knowledge by both co-
operating with external entities and increasing communication be-
tween internal departments in order to introduce either new or higher 
quality products faster and more cheaply than competitors and to 
gain new competitive advantage. External and internal linkages con-
stitute what is called “corporate social capital”. The role played by 
partners as a source of knew - knowledge is becoming more impor-
tant than in the past, as entrepreneurs recognise that technological 
innovations are less and less the outcome of an individual firm’s iso-
lated effort (Fisher and Varga, 2002; Drejer and Jorgensen, 2005). 
Starting from the seminal contribution of Mariti and Smiley 
(1983), a substantial empirical and theoretical effort has been de-
voted to an understanding of R&D collaboration (for a survey of the 
literature see, e.g., Ozman, 2009). In particular, a large number of 
cross-sectional studies have shown the positive impact of external 
R&D cooperation on corporate innovation performance. This result 
parallels the well known fact that innovations are increasingly 
brought in the market by networks of firms (see, e.g., Loof et al, 
2002, Miotti and Schwald, 2003; Faems et al, 2005; Hoang et al., 
2005; Loof et al. 2008). This can be explained through different 
theoretical arguments: R&D partnerships are alternatively seen as 
means to internalize spillover, to reduce transaction costs and/or to 
explore and assimilate new knowledge fields embedded in other 
firms’ core competencies. 
Even if the number of R&D partnerships has significantly in-
creased in the last 20 years, most of the existing literature does not 
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distinguish cooperation by type of partners, but instead aggregates 
over cooperation types, with some notable exceptions (Belderbos et 
al., 2004; Tether, 2002). 
This paper aims at investigating the determinants of cooperative 
behaviour of Italian innovative firms. The influence of cooperation 
on firms’ capability to introduce new or significantly improved 
goods, services or production processes is analysed using firm level 
data from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS 2008) for Italy. In 
contrast with previous literature, we examine this phenomenon over 
three dimensions: vertical cooperation, i.e. firms that carry out coop-
eration with customers and suppliers; horizontal cooperation, i.e. 
firms’ that cooperate with their competitors, consultants, research in-
stitutes or private labs, and institutional cooperation, i.e. cooperation 
agreements with Universities and public research centres. This paper 
therefore combines considerations related to the determinants of 
R&D cooperation with issues dealing with the impact of collabora-
tion on innovation performance. 
Our dataset includes both innovative and non-innovative firms. 
Since the partner for cooperation activity is only observed for those 
firms that innovate, we face a possible problem of sample selection. 
As a consequence, we apply a Heckman probit to account for this is-
sue. The model we estimate is thus composed by two equations, the 
first devoted to innovative and the second to cooperative behaviour. 
Since we are interested in exploring the determinants of cooperation, 
we include each explanatory variable in all these two equations.  
With reference to innovation activities, the present paper aims at 
investigating i) the determinants of firms’ partner choice for collabo-
ration and, ii) the factors affecting firms’ capability to introduce new 
or significantly improved goods and/or services and/or processes. 
We show that forms of collaboration differ across cooperation types 
and vary strongly according to specific firms’ attributes. In particu-
lar: (i) internal and external R&D acquisitions and belonging to the 
scientific sector have a significant positive impact on collaboration 
with Universities and other research centers; (ii) external R&D ac-
quisition, being part of a business group and public financial support 
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are dominant positive determinants both for vertical and horizontal 
collaboration.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
on the relation between collaboration networks and innovation whilst 
Section 3 provides an overview of  the data and some descriptive sta-
tistics. Section 4 describes the variables used by the Heckman model 
and Section 5 discusses empirical results. Section 6 provides the 
conclusions and the policy implications. A methodological appendix 
regarding the econometric specification used in the empirical analy-
sis completes the paper. 
2 - Literature Review  
As cooperation has become more and more crucial in inno-
vation processes, firms have been struggling to find external part-
ners. In recent years several theoretical and empirical analyses have 
been put forward to explain R&D cooperation strategies for innova-
tion. In particular, we focus on two main streams of research. 
The first is the industrial organization literature, which focuses on 
the importance of both incoming and outgoing spillover as a major 
determinants or R&D cooperation strategies. The second regards the 
management literature, which applies the transaction cost theory and 
concludes that firms may choose to cooperate in order to reduce and 
share respectively the costs and the risks associated to the innovation 
process (see, e.g., Das and Tend, 2000). 
As regard the first approach, the incoming spillovers refer to the 
external flow of knowledge a firm may be able to grasp, while outgo-
ing spillovers pertain to firms’ ability to control the stock of knowl-
edge that may eventually flow out of the firm itself. In early studies 
on R&D collaboration, cooperation was most often captured as a 
homogenous object (i.e. R&D cooperation vs. internal R&D) and the 
emphasis was mainly on technological spillovers as factors that in-
fluence the firms’ decision to cooperate (see, e.g., Kats, 1986; 
D’Aspermont et al., 1988; and Kamien et al., 1992). They conclude 
that if incoming spillovers are sufficiently high, firms are induced to 
collaborate in order to internalize the possible advantages. Moreover, 
the possibility of knowledge leakages may increase firms’ willing-
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ness to take advantage of R&D investment partners. These early 
models have been later extended, recognizing that firms attempt to 
minimize the outgoing spillover, and maximize the incoming spill-
over (Belderbos et al. 2004; Lopez, 2008). 
In recent years, this relationship has been empirically tested. Cas-
siman and Veugelers (2002) measure the impact of publicly available 
information on the probability of collaboration and show that a 
higher probability of collaborating with research organizations is as-
sociated with a higher incoming spillover. Moreover, Veugelers and 
Cassiman (2005) show that the main characteristics of the R&D co-
operation between industry and University are the high uncertainty, 
the high transaction costs and the high spillovers to other market ac-
tors, while the firms’ ability to control the outgoing spillover is not 
crucial for this decision.  
Whilst research institutions (University and Research Centre) aim 
at providing new scientific and technological knowledge (Drejer and 
Jorgenses, 2005) which are relevant in producing innovation, only a 
few studies consider this relationship. Ashhoff et al. (2006) conclude 
that collaborations with Universities improve the probability of inno-
vative firms of developing new products, and Belderbos et al. (2004) 
find that it increases in the growth of sales are related to market nov-
elties. Loof et al. (2008) show that this kind of collaboration influ-
ences innovative performance. Levy et al. (2009) find that companies 
in high tech sectors, or located in foreign countries are likely to acti-
vate a multi-partner collaboration with the University, while domes-
tic and regional companies have higher propensity to activate exclu-
sive collaboration. 
The second approach aimed at explaining  the determinants of 
R&D cooperation emphazises the firms’ resources constraints, i.e. 
cost, risk, knowledge complementarities, appropriability as determi-
nants of cooperation. In this sense, the innovation success is influ-
enced by the nature of cooperation partners. Collaboration can be ei-
ther vertical or horizontal. 
Vertical collaboration can be established with customers or sup-
pliers and allows a firm to gain considerable knowledge about new 
technologies, markets and process improvements (Whitley, 2002). It 
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has a more significant impact on both product and process innovation 
(Miotti and Schwald, 2003). Specifically, cooperation with custom-
ers aims to reduce the risk related to market uncertainty by increas-
ing the probability that the innovation will be a commercial success 
while collaboration with suppliers aims to secure and increase the 
quality of firms’ inputs and to benefit from cost reductions through 
innovation process. In particular, Fritsch and Lukas (2001) state that 
innovative efforts are associated with client collaboration finalized to 
achieve product innovations. Moreover, there is a strong evidence 
that market information from clients and a direct collaborations leads 
to more successful new product development (see, e.g., Amara and 
Landry, 2005). Tether (2002) also concludes that collaborations with 
clients could be beneficial when we consider innovation with high 
degree of novelty. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) show that higher 
appropriability1 increases the probability of cooperation with suppli-
ers and customers but has no significant impact on cooperation with 
research institution. Lopez (2008) contrasts this result and shows that 
the effectiveness of strategic protection has a positive impact on co-
operation with any other partner. Furthermore, collaboration with 
suppliers allows firm to reduce the risk of new product development, 
while contribute to improve flexibility, product quality and market 
adaptability (Chung and Kim, 2003). Catozzella and Vivarelli (2007) 
emphasize the role played by internal R&D investments in fostering 
the complementarity of innovative inputs. Innovation is a complex 
phenomenon consisting of substitutability and complementarity rela-
tionships, where the possibility of benefiting of synergies between 
innovative inputs depends on the amount of internal R&D. In-house 
R&D, besides generating an innovative output by its own, expands 
the effects of other innovative inputs interacting with it. Finally, co-
operation with customers is positively related to the success of proc-
ess innovations (Freel et al., 2006) and positively affects growth in 
sales of product and services new to the market (Belderbos et al., 
2004). It is worth noticing that firms’ interactive dynamic capabili-
                                                     
1 We refer to appropriability as the firms’ ability to control outflows of knowledge. 
If firms are not able to protect their knowledge, the possibility of free-riding in-
creases, and the probability of signing collaboration agreements decreases. 
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ties may be positively affected by firms’ interactions with clients and 
suppliers (Iammarino et al., 2013). Vertical cooperation is based on a 
complex process of “learning by interaction or using” from upstream 
suppliers and downstream users (Von Hippel, 1988).  
Horizontal collaboration can be established with competitors. It is 
often motivated by concerns regarding knowledge appropriability 
(as, e.g. in D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988), knowledge ex-
change or cost sharing (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003) and aims at pro-
ducing some basic research and at establishing standards by sharing 
common problems outside the competitor’s area of influence (Tether, 
2002; Bayona et al., 2001). This is because collaborating with a 
competitor can greatly enhance the knowledge base of a firm because 
competitors usually have similar needs in terms of product and proc-
ess development so that the knowledge base developed by a firm 
may be particularly relevant for its competitors. However, because 
partners remain competitors, it is not certain that they will be sys-
tematically very cooperative in sharing their knowledge. In fact, if 
from one side pre-competitive programs can provide the grounds for 
working with competitors, form the other side firms engaged in such 
agreements face the risk of stiff competition in the future. The em-
pirical evidence is not unique. Belderbos et al. (2004), Loof et al. 
(2002), and Aschhoff et al (2008) seem to confirm that horizontal 
cooperation improve firm performance. However, Caloghirou et al. 
(2003) and Dyer et al. (2006) do not find a significant impact of 
competitors on the overall success of R&D.  
Recently, the so called “open innovation model” (see, e.g., Ches-
brough, 2003, Laursen and Salter 2006) reinforce the view that firms 
draw knowledge that may lie outside their own boundaries. More 
precisely, according to this paradigm, firms should use inflows and 
outflows of knowledge and expand the market for the external use of 
innovation by collaborating with partners. In this way firms would 
share risks and reward thus achieving advanced technological capa-
bilities (Iammarino et al., 2013).  
It is important to point out that both horizontal and vertical col-
laboration involve learning processes which rely on the firm’s ab-
sorptive capacity (Von Tunzelmann, 2009) In fact, cooperation in 
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R&D and other innovation activities may positively affect the firm’s 
competencies and capabilities only if the firm’s learning and absorp-
tion processes are at work. In this framework, learning process may 
be either internal (that is generated by the production activity) or ex-
ternal (that is stemming from suppliers, users or general advances in 
science and technology) (Iammarino et al., 2013). 
 
 
 
3 - Data description 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the Community Innova-
tion Survey 2008 (CIS 2008). The Community Innovation Survey is 
a firm level survey, compiled every 4 years in all EU member states 
and some non-EU countries. The survey on the Italian sample is ad-
ministered by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).  
The CIS 2008 is a micro dataset specifically planned to study the 
innovative performance at firm-level and, as such, it has been de-
signed to analyse the main features of firms’ innovation activities. 
The CIS questionnaire provides both a set of general information 
(such as main industry of affiliation, group belonging, turnover, em-
ployment, exports, etc.) and a broad set of variables measuring the 
firms’ level of innovation (e.g. expenditure on innovation, public 
funding, sources of information for innovation, innovation co-
operation, innovation objectives, organisational and marketing inno-
vation, environmental related benefits from innovation, etc.).  
In particular, CIS 2008 focuses on co-operations towards the at-
tainment of innovation insofar as it measures the active partnership 
of the observed enterprise with other enterprises or non-commercial 
institutions such as Universities or public research institutes, both at 
a national and an international level. Moreover, co-operation may in-
volve more than one partner and concerns products, services and 
process innovations. The questionnaire collects data coming from a 
stratified sample of companies, which proves to be representative of 
the Italian firms with more than 10 employees in different sectors. 
The extensions of sample results to the entire population can be done 
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by means of a weighting procedure that relates the interviewed firms 
to those of the population (ISTAT, 2010). The 53 percent response 
rate registered for this data set has determined a sample of 19,904 
firms. Given the original CIS 2008 database, we proceeded to restrict 
the analysis to units with observable values for the expenditure in ex-
ternal R&D activities. We further drop firms declaring to co-operate 
although not innovating. We end up with a sample of 19,890 firms. 
In order not to reduce the representativeness of the sample at stake 
we have not further restricted its size at a first stage of the analysis. 
The composition of the sample firms used in the analysis is shown in 
Figure 1. On the whole of the 19,890 firms, 38 percent (7,463) out of 
all firms are innovative. Specifically, the innovative firms are de-
fined as those that accomplished technological innovations during 
the period 2006-2008. 
With reference to cooperation with external agents, the survey 
asked innovative firms two sequential questions. The former aimed 
at knowing whether firms have signed any cooperative agreement on 
innovation activities with other firms or institutions during the three 
years 2006-2008 or not. Firms that signed a cooperative agreement 
were asked to indicate the type of firms and institutions they cooper-
ated with, as well as its geographical location. Respondents could se-
lect more than one partner among these: other businesses within the 
business group; suppliers of equipment, materials, services, or soft-
ware; clients or customers; competitors or other businesses in your 
industry; consultants, R&D institutes and private labs; Universities 
or other higher education institutions; Government or public research 
institutes. In the same question the information on the type partners 
is crossed with that of its geographical location: a) Italy, b) the EU 
member states, candidates and EFTA countries, c) the United States, 
d) China and India, and e) other countries. 
Among innovative firms, a share of 22 percent (1,609) signed at 
least one co-operative agreement on innovation related activities dur-
ing the period 2006-2008. Figure 2 lists the types of collaborations. 
Since the second question allowed for multiple responses, we report 
the number of innovators by type of partners as a share of innovative 
co-operators. The most selected type of partner are suppliers of 
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equipment, materials, services, or software, followed by consultants, 
commercial labs, or private R&D institutes and Universities or other 
higher education institutions. Figure 3 gives an overview of the geo-
graphical distributions of cooperative agreements, by reporting the 
number of innovators by geographical location of partners as a share 
of innovative co-operators.  
In what follows, we focus on firms that have answered as under-
going both the horizontal and vertical “technological cooperation”. 
 
4 - Model Specification  
 
The aim of the model is to reveal which firms’ characteristics influ-
ence the firm’s capability to collaborate on innovative activities with 
different partners and to introduce new or significantly improved 
good/services/production process.  
For this purpose we use a bivariate probit model with sample se-
lection where the R&D cooperation ( 2)y can be observed if and only 
if the innovation activity 1( )y in the selection equation is equal to 
one. The model, which is discussed in detail in the methodological 
appendix, can be synthetically specified as follows  
                 
'
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0 0
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 14
The LR (Likelihood Ratio) test rejects the hypothesis that the cor-
relation between the error terms is equal to zero. Therefore we esti-
mate jointly the equations by using the maximum likelihood method 
(ML). This confirms the correlation between the unobservable com-
ponents in the selection and outcome equations.  
In order to estimate the selection equation, we first distinguish in-
novative from non-innovative firms. For the purpose of this study, all 
firms that introduced new or significantly improved goods or servic-
es and/or the processes used to produce or supply all goods or servic-
es, are considered as innovators. These may be new to the business 
or new to the market. We consider both national and international 
partners. For the econometric analysis we are interested in factors af-
fecting the firm’s attitude both to cooperate and to innovate. Econo-
metric estimates in this paper adopt the following firm-level  indica-
tors as explanatory variables:  
 
1) Part of a business group: being part of a group can influence 
firms’ propensity to be engaged in successful innovation and 
to cooperate with an increasing number of partner (see, for in-
stance, Piga et al., 2004; Dachs et al., 2008). Mairesse et al. 
(2002) underline the expected innovative benefits due to easi-
er access to (internal) finance and to the effect of intra-group 
knowledge spillovers for firms that are members of industrial 
groups. Similarly, Iammarino et al. (2012) point that the 
firm’s technological status benefits from the relationships 
within a group. If the firm is part of a business group the bi-
nary variable takes the value 1.  
2) Sales: in CIS questionnaire firms are asked to estimate the 
amount of sales in 2006 and 2008. We account for the amount 
of sales at the beginning of the 3 year period, at December 
31st 2006, to avoid endogeneity, due to possible simultaneity 
between sales growth and the firm’s innovation capabilities. 
3) Scientific sectors: collaborations may differ depending on the 
type of industry. There are sectors where firms present a 
higher level of innovation and R&D practice. Thus, following 
Mohnen and Hoareau (2003) we aggregate all industries with 
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a high level of technology in a unique sector defined as the 
scientific sector2. Moreover, Pavitt sectoral dummies were 
added to the econometric specification in order to control for 
the different sectorial technological opportunity and appro-
priability conditions.  
4) Small and medium size: firm size is defined in terms of num-
ber of employees. Respondents estimate the business’s aver-
age number of employees at the end of 2008. Through this 
variable, we distinguish between firms with less than 250 
employees to account for the firm’s size. Following the 
Schumpeterian view, small and medium businesses are sup-
posed to have lower ability to innovate and to cooperate 
(Schumpeter, 1943). 
 
As it is well known, in order to cope with the identification issue in 
an Heckman model, the selection equation should have at least one 
variable that is not in the outcome equation in order to get rid of 
identification problems. However, we introduce additional variables 
both in the outcome and in the selection equation. Part of the obser-
vations for the additional variables in the outcome equation are cen-
sored and therefore these covariates can be used only in the first step. 
Additional variables which are included in the selection equation are: 
new organizational strategies in public relations and  new pricing 
policies. The firm’s attitude to innovate strategies of relations with 
other firms or public institutions, through new production or com-
mercial agreements, is posited to affect innovation. Similarly, the 
firm’s flexibility to introduce new pricing policies, through adequate 
                                                     
2 This includes the following industries: manufacturers of coke and refined 
petroleum, chemical and pharmaceutical products, computer, electronic and 
optical products, machinery and equipment, motor vehicles, trailers and 
other transport equipment, telecommunications, computer programming, 
consultancy and related activities, information service activities, architec-
tural and engineering activities, technical testing and analysis, scientific re-
search and development. The name code classification is reported in Ap-
pendix B, Table B1. 
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discount schemes, can increase the firm’s market power and there-
fore attract the necessary funds to invest in innovation activities. 
We do not introduce variables that might potentially arise bias 
due to simultaneity, that is when explanatory variables are jointly de-
termined with the dependent variable. Firstly, we exclude dummy for 
internationalization, measured as the presence of the firm in foreign 
markets. Firms’ competitiveness and technological innovation have 
to increase simultaneously to maintain the market share in the inten-
tional scenario (e.g. Archibugi and Iammarino, 1999; Narula and 
Zanfei, 2003). Since innovation, innovative cooperation and interna-
tionalization are jointly determined, it is not possible to analyze 
causal relationships with a dataset without adequate instrumental va-
riables or longitudinal data. 
Similarly, we do not include dummies for other organizational or 
advertising innovations because these are likely to arise unobservable 
effects, since these are often the outcomes of managerial skills in in-
novating. In fact, the introduction of an innovation is often the result 
of both organizational innovations aimed at improving the product 
and services delivery, and new methods of work organization, such 
as the introduction of mechanisms of individual responsibilities or 
team-working, which improve the internal efficiency. Similarly, once 
the firm innovates, the channel of distribution of innovative products 
and services needs to be upgraded to new marketing practice and to 
new advertising techniques, such as, e.g., the launch of a new brand 
and/or the introduction of loyalty cards. These techniques reveal the 
firm’s attitude and managerial capabilities to promote the entry into 
new markets.  
The additional variables for the outcome equation are: public fi-
nancial support, internal and external R&D, acquisition of machi-
nery, equipment and software and training for innovative activities. 
These variables can be correlated also with innovation, but since they 
have censored observation they can only be used in the outcome eq-
uation. 
Public financial support includes financial support via tax credits 
or deductions, grants, subsidized loans and equity investments. A 
Government subsidy or a fiscal incentive should increase a firm’s in-
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novative performance, although the empirical evidence on this is 
quite controversial.  
As far as the internal R&D, it can be defined as that set of crea-
tive work undertaken within the business that increases knowledge 
for developing new and improved goods or services and processes. 
However, some firms may choose to purchase external R&D per-
formed by companies, including other businesses within the group, 
or by public or private research organizations.  
Moreover, investment in innovative activities often implies both 
the acquisition of advanced machinery and equipment as well as 
computer hardware and software, and the training for innovative ac-
tivities. As argued by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), Piga et al. 
(2004) and Lambertini et al. (2004), firms with high levels of absorp-
tive capacity are better prepared to join other partners in innovative 
projects. We use as a measure of absorptive capacity the training for 
innovative activities intensity. The binary variable indicates whether 
firms invest in specific internal or external training for their person-
nel with the aim of supporting them in innovative development. The 
hypothesis to be tested through empirical analysis can be synthesized 
as: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms’ attitude towards innovative cooperation should 
be positively and significantly influenced by characteristics such as 
being part of a business group, sales, belonging to scientific sectors, 
benefiting from public funding and investments in in-house and ex-
ternal R&D, machinery, software and training for innovative activi-
ties. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Firms’ attitude towards innovative cooperation should 
be negatively and significantly influenced by being a small and me-
dium enterprise. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Firms’ ability to innovate should be positively and 
significantly influenced by characteristics such as being part of a 
business group, sales, belonging to scientific sectors, benefiting from 
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public funding, new strategies in public relations and new pricing 
policies. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Firms’ ability to innovate should be negatively and 
significantly influenced by being a small and medium enterprise. 
 
Table 1 describes the variables used in the empirical analysis and re-
ports the variable means in percentage values. In CIS 2008 sample 
28 percent of firms are part of a business group. The average amount 
of sales is almost 42,000 in 2006 and almost 47,000 in 2008. Interes-
tingly, 62 percent of firms registered an increase in sales growth 
from 2006 to 2008. In Table 1 turnover values are transformed in 
natural log. Furthermore, we aggregate technological firms in a sin-
gle scientific sector including a minority of the sample, representing 
only 9 percent of the firms. We have information on the firm’s size 
for almost all sectors: 90 percent are small and medium sized enter-
prises. This percentage would be even higher considering that the 
CIS sample does not include firms with fewer than ten employees. A 
small proportion of firms, 12 percent, benefited from public financial 
support on innovation related activities. Amongst innovation expend-
iture, the more frequent is the acquisition of machinery, equipment 
and software (31 percent), followed by training for innovative activi-
ties (20 percent) and by internal R&D activities (15 percent). Only 7 
percent of companies purchase external R&D competencies. With 
reference to changes in business strategies, almost a quarter of the 
total sample applied new organizational strategies in public relations. 
Firms are  less prone to introducing changes in prices (12 percent).  
The second part of Table 1 shows the conditional means for the 
set of covariates. Observing the distribution of innovative firms we 
note that, on average, almost 32 percent of them are part of a group. 
The average log of turnover for innovative firms is similar to the un-
conditional mean. Interestingly, among innovative firms we observe 
a high percentage of small and medium enterprises (82 percent) and 
firms purchasing machinery, equipment and software (81 percent). 
The proportions of firms belonging to an industrial group are rela-
tively higher among University and Government cooperators (64 
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percent), compared to the other two cooperating groups (52 percent 
and 54 percent). In the subsample of businesses collaborating with 
institutions, 44 percent of the firms are in the scientific sector and 65 
percent benefit from public financial support. The presence of firms 
investing in internal or external R&D activities, as deducted by com-
paring the three columns of collaborating firms, is higher among 
firms which engage in Universities and Government partnerships.  
 
 
5 - Results 
 
This section discusses the results, answering the research questions 
about the determinants of cooperation and innovation probabilities. 
We replicate the estimation process for three different types of coop-
eration: firms that have cooperation agreements with Universities 
and public research centres (institutional), firms that carry out verti-
cal cooperation with customers and suppliers (vertical), firms that 
carry out horizontal cooperation with their competitors (horizontal). 
We do not consider collaboration with other firms within the same 
group to avoid endogeneity. 
Table 2 shows the estimates for different types of collaborations 
and the set of explanatory variables.  
 
5.1. Determinants of cooperation probability between firms and in-
stitutions or other partners, conditional on innovating 
 
Table 2 reports Heckman probit coefficients estimates of firm-
specific factors, measuring the effects of firm’s characteristics on the 
probability of institutional, vertical and horizontal cooperation condi-
tional on the firm’s ability to innovate. In the cooperation equation, 
we observe that being part of a business group positively and signifi-
cantly affects the probability that the firm enters cooperative agree-
ments for all types of cooperation. Similarly, firms that belong to 
scientific sectors are also more likely to be involved in institutional 
cooperation than traditional industries. These results partially con-
firm Hypothesis 1 and are consistent with Mohnen and Horeau 
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(2003), who find a positive effect for technological sectors, although 
our results show that this effect is not significant for vertical and ho-
rizontal cooperation. Differently from what expected in Hypothesis 
1, the estimated coefficient of natural log of sales, shows that  this 
measure of the firm’s size has a negatively effect on both vertical and 
horizontal cooperation.  
As expected (Hypothesis 2), SMEs are less prone to cooperate 
with other partners and therefore less able to innovate. This reinforce 
findings by Frischer and Varga (2002), who find size to be an impor-
tant factor for industry-public collaboration. Compared to large 
firms, SMEs have more difficulties in entering cooperative networks 
and developing new R&D linkages, due to lower financial resources 
and little accumulation of experience in technical knowledge (Chun 
and Mun, 2011). Although small firms could overcome these con-
straints by joining cooperative agreement, firm’s size may still ham-
per R&D cooperation due to the lack of the necessary human re-
sources and management skills required to engage in cooperative ac-
tivities. In line with Hypothesis 1, the more the firm benefits from 
public financial support, the more the firm is likely to engage in co-
operative agreements.  
Another key factor for cooperative behavior is the investment in 
internal R&D. This is in line with the conclusion of other empirical 
studies (Fritsch and Lukas 2001, Berlderbos et al. 2004) and con-
firms the results of Fischer and Varga (2002), who estimate that in-
house research activities increase the probability of cooperation with 
public institutions. In-house R&D seems to reinforce the firm’s ab-
sorptive process: Catozzella and Vivarelli (2007) find that internal 
R&D is the most important determinant of innovative output, allow-
ing for higher complementarity effects between diversified innova-
tive inputs. Indeed, firms that invest in internal innovation activities, 
may accumulate the required ability to develop projects involving 
external institutions, such as Universities and Government. To gain a 
deeper insight into this evidence, Table 3 compares the average 
amount of internal and external R&D expenditure for the year 2008 
by types of collaborations. The group of firms joining at least one 
cooperative agreements with Universities and Government laborato-
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ries presents the highest average expenditure in internal R&D activi-
ties. 
Results show that external R&D activities have also a positive 
and significant effect on all types of cooperation. Acquisitions of 
machinery, equipment and software have some positive influence on-
ly in terms of vertical cooperation. Expenditure in on-the-job innova-
tive training has a stronger positive effect on vertical rather than ho-
rizontal agreements, while it results not having any influence on in-
stitutional partnerships. 
For most of the variables, the statistical significance of the esti-
mated parameters is quite similar among types of collaborations, thus 
revealing robust regularities in the attitude towards cooperation of 
innovation related activities. However, the magnitude of coefficients 
differs if we compare the effects for institutional, vertical or horizon-
tal collaboration. In order to better qualify Hypothesis 1 and 2 we 
rank coefficients on the base of their magnitude. The dominant va-
riables for institutional cooperative behavior are: public financial 
support, internal and external R&D investments.  Differently, the 
dominant factors of vertical cooperation are: external R&D, being 
part of a business group and public financial support. For the proba-
bility of horizontal innovation the key factors are: external R&D, 
public financial support and being part of a business group. Surpri-
singly, a minor role is played by the acquisition of machinery, 
equipment and software, by sales and investments in job training.  
 
5.2. Determinants of innovation probability 
 
The coefficient estimates of the selection equations, compared in the 
second part of Table 2, indicate which firm’s characteristics have a 
higher impact on the innovation probability. Results are very similar 
across models. Surprisingly, as opposed to Hypothesis 3 being part 
of a business group decreases the probability of innovating. The level 
of sales, belonging to scientific sectors and the development of new 
strategies in firm’s public relations and pricing policies strongly sup-
ports the ability to innovate. As expected from Hypothesis 4, we ob-
tain a negative small and medium enterprise sized effect.  
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The three dominant determinants in this case are: new organiza-
tional strategies in public relations, new pricing policies and belong-
ing to a scientific sector. 
 
6 - Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we have explored the determinants of R&D cooperative 
behavior of Italian innovative firms and analysed the impact of col-
laboration on innovation performance. We used firm level data from 
the Community Innovation Survey (CIS 2008) for Italy. Cooperation 
has been analysed along three dimensions, namely  vertical (with 
customers and suppliers), horizontal (with competitors) and institu-
tional (with Universities and public research centers). We used a bi-
variate Heckman probit model to control for sample selection and 
partial observability and we further replicated the estimates for the 
above mentioned three different types of cooperation. This modeling 
strategy allows us to distinguish the determinants of innovation from 
the determinants of collaborations. 
As far as the latter, our analysis shows that forms of collaboration 
differ across cooperation types and vary strongly according to spe-
cific firms’ attributes. We find that public financial support, internal 
and external R&D acquisitions, have a significant positive impact on 
collaboration with Universities and other research centres. As in 
Varga (2002), our analysis indicates that in-house research activity 
increases the cooperation probability among firms and institutional 
partners. We find, moreover, that there are three dominant positive 
determinants both for vertical and horizontal collaboration, i.e. i) ex-
ternal R&D acquisition; ii) being part of a business group; and, iii) 
public financial support. Finally, the size seems to be an important 
factor for industry-public collaboration. SME, for example, are less 
prone to cooperate with other partners (and therefore less able to in-
novate). In contrast with Fisher and Varga (2002) operating in an in-
ternational market has a negative effect on firms’ attitude to cooper-
ate. Italian firms seems to be more linked to local rather than interna-
tional partners. 
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As far as the determinants of innovation, we find that the devel-
opment of new organizational strategies in public relations and new 
pricing policies strongly enhances the ability to innovate. On the 
contrary, being part of a group decreases the probability of innovat-
ing. The above mentioned size effect, with small firms less inclined 
to cooperation than large ones, also entails a smaller probability of 
innovation for entrepreneurial activities of limited dimension. Fi-
nally, belonging to scientific sectors and the firm’s turnover, are both 
positive important factors for innovation fostering.  
These results have clear implication in terms of innovation policy. 
First, policies to increase firms’ size are strong innovation drivers. In 
this respect inter-firm aggregation and the creation of technological 
network seem relevant goals for industrial policy authorities. More-
over, public administrations have a key role in promoting coopera-
tion activities by offering public funds to innovative firms. 
Finally, it is important to stress that a panel-data study would be 
an important complement to the findings of this paper. However, this 
is currently difficult with Community Innovation Survey data man-
agement and we leave therefore this issue for future research. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of firms that introduced new  
or significantly improved goods, services  
or production processes during the period 2006-2008. 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of innovators by type of partners  
as a share of innovative co-operators, CIS 2006-2008. 
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Figure 3: Number of innovators by geographical location  
of partners as a share of innovative co-operators,  
CIS 2006-2008. 
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Appendix A 
 
Section A1: Methodological Appendix 
 
This section presents the model specification and deals with related 
methodological issues. The Italian CIS 2008 database contains quali-
tative information regarding the different channels of knowledge 
transfer between firms and the various actors within the innovative 
system. In particular, it poses questions regarding collaborative 
agreements in a sequential way.  
As a first step, firms had to declare whether they were innovative 
or not in the years covered by the survey (2006-2008). In that case, 
they were asked had  they had any cooperation arrangements with 
any type of partner. Finally, cooperating firms were asked to specify 
the type of partner. 
Since only innovative firms were requested about possible col-
laboration, the latter variable is not recorded for non-innovative en-
terprises and this may raise a sample selection bias in the estimation 
technique using CIS2008 data. Hence, estimating the cooperation 
equation for only innovative firms, by neglecting the underlying se-
lection mechanism, would not take into account that missing infor-
mation on non informative firms is not completely random. In fact, 
non innovative firms represent a self-selected sample, not a random 
sample, as the decision to innovate or not was made by individual 
firms. It is likely that firms that have a low propensity for collabora-
tion choose not to collaborate and this would account for much of the 
missing data. It is therefore likely that by using the simple probit 
model, which considers only innovative firms, we overestimate 
firm’s collaboration propensity. On the other hand, if in estimating a 
bivariate probit, which firstly considers  the firm’s choice in matters 
of innovation, and  secondly  the firm’s cooperation propensity, the 
missing values on collaboration  are replaced by zeros, this would 
result in an underestimation of this latter variable. In fact, estimating 
missing data with zeros would mean assuming no collaboration for 
non innovative firms.  
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The probability of a firm’s involvement in cooperative agree-
ments, conditioned on the probability that it innovates, is modelled 
by using a bivariate probit suitable for partial observability; namely a 
Heckman probit model composed of two equations. This model ac-
counts for sample selection because all variables are completely ob-
served in the innovation (selection) probit equation, while only a se-
lected (censored) sample of them is present in the collaboration (out-
come) probit equation. 
The first equation, which describes the probability of a firm  be-
ing selected (that is the probability of experiencing innovation), is 
specified as follows 
 
* '
1 1 1 1i i iy ε= +x β  
where *1iy  is a latent variable that indicates whether the i-th firm in-
novates or not, 1ix  is a set of explanatory variables accounting for 
the decision of firm i to innovate (see Table 2 for a full description of 
these covariates).  1β  is the vector of the associated coefficients and 
1iε  is an error term. Subsequently, a binary variable 1iy  is associ-
ated to the latent variable *1iy  in such a way that a zero value for 1iy  
is associated to a negative value for *1iy  whereas a unity value for 
1iy  is associated to a non-negative value for
*
1iy . In formulas 
 
*
1 1
*
1 1
1 0
0 0
i i
i i
y if y
y if y
= >
= ≤  
 
The second equation, describing the propensity for collaboration 
(main event), is specified as follows: 
* '
2 2 2 2i i iy ε= +x β  
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where *2iy  is the latent variable that indicates whether the i-th firm 
sets up a collaboration agreement or not in order to pursue innova-
tion. 2ix  is a set of explanatory variables accounting for the decision 
of firm i to cooperate, including the determinants of the firm’s be-
haviour, such as internationalization, group, sales growth, scientific 
sectors, size, public financial support and so on. 2β  is the vector of 
the associated coefficients and  is an error term. As before, a bi-
nary variable 2iy  (whose outcomes are of main interest) is attached 
to the latent variable *2iy  in such a way that a zero response to 2iy  is 
associated to a negative value for *2iy , whereas a unity response for 
2iy  is associated to a non negative value for 
*
2iy :  
 
*
2 2
*
2 2
1 0
0 0
i i
i i
y if y
y if y
= >
= ≤  
 
 
Noting that 2iy  is observed if and only if 1iy  is equal to one.  
In addition, we assume that the error terms 1iε  and 2iε  are iden-
tically distributed over time according to a bivariate normal distribu-
tion with mean 0. Since the scale of the dependant variables  *iy  is 
undefined, we can further assume, with no loss of generality, that 
both the variances of 1iε  and 2iε  are unitary, that is 
 
1 2( ) ( ) 1i ivar varε ε= =  
 
In addition, we assume that 
1 2( , )i icov ε ε ρ=  
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where ρ  shows the correlation between the error terms (due to un-
accounted factors) in both the probability to innovate and cooperate. 
The log-likelihood of this model is built as the sum of three log-
likelihoods, thus reflecting the true dataset structure: firms that do 
not innovate, firms that innovate but do not collaborate and, firms 
that both innovate and collaborate 
 
                                   
1 2 3
1 0 1 1, 2 0 1 1, 2 1i i i i iy y y y y
lnL lnA lnA lnA
= = = = =
= + +∑ ∑ ∑       (1) 
where  
1
'
1 1 1( )iA = −Φ x β  is the likelihood corresponding to firms that do not 
innovate, with 1Φ  denoting the cumulative univariate normal distri-
bution function; 
1 2
' '
2 2 1 2( , , )i iA ρ= −Φ x β x β  is the likelihood corresponding to firms 
that innovate but do not cooperate, with 2Φ  denoting the distribu-
tion function of a bivariate normal density; 
1 2
' '
3 2 1 2( , , )i iA ρ=Φ x β x β  is the likelihood corresponding to firms 
that both innovate and cooperate. 3 
Should the error terms be uncorrelated, meaning that the above 
bivariate probit is a model based on decisions taken sequentially but 
                                                     
3 If we denote with N the total number of firms in the sample, with M the number of 
the innovative firms and with N1 the number of the firms that established a collabo-
ration relationship, then the likelihood function can be written as follows 
1
1
' ' ' ' '
2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1
1 1 1
( , , ) ( , , ) ( )
N M N
i i i i i
i i N i m
ρ ρ
= = + = +
− −∏ ∏ ∏Φ x β x β Φ x β x β Φ x β
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independently, the above log-likelihood function would be the sum 
of two separate log-likelihoods. A likelihood ratio test4 (LR) can be 
used to validate the hypothesis of independent equations. When ρ  is 
significantly different from zero, the LR test rejects the hypothesis of 
independent equations and this entails that the estimation of the 
equations cannot be done separately.  
The parameters 1β , 2β  and ρ  can be estimated  either by the 
maximum likelihood (ML), that is by maximizing the likelihood of 
observing 0/1 responses on 1y  and the 0/1 responses to 2y con-
tained in the whole sample, or the Heckman two-step method. In this 
latter approach, the two equations are separately estimated. As a first 
step, the ML probit estimation of the selection equation produces an 
estimate of the inverse Mills ratio for each observation. This estimate 
is added to the outcome equation as an additional “control” variable 
to accommodate the selection effect (Greene, 2012) 5,6. 
                                                     
4 This test, whose asymptotic distribution is a chi-squared variable with one degree 
of freedom, compares the likelihood of the full bivariate model with the sum of the 
likelihoods for the univariate probit models. 
5 In this paper we apply the two methods because both the ML and the Heckman’s 
two-step estimation present some drawbacks and there is not a dominant technique 
in the literature. On the one hand, the ML method, based on the strong assumption 
of normality in the error terms, may raise some problems of convergence. On the 
other hand, in a two-step method  the heteroschedastic nature of the error term in the 
outcome equation (see the following note) should be duly taken into account when 
the standard errors of the estimated coefficients are computed. 
 
6 As Heckman showed, sample selection (or incidental truncation) causes a specifi-
cation error in the outcome equation which is given by the omission of a variable, 
namely the inverse Mills ratio. In fact it can be proved that  
* * '
2 21 1 21 2( , 0)i i iE y y ρλ> = +x x β  
where iλ  , called the inverse Mills ratio, is given by  
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Section A2: Robustness check, the Heckman two-step method 
 
This section is concerned with examining the robustness of rankings 
of coefficients on cooperative behavior to variations in the method 
for deriving those coefficients. In fact, the bivariate model with sam-
ple selection can be estimated using the ML probit procedure, as for 
the previous illustrated results, and the Heckman two-step method. In 
this sub-section we present the results of this second procedure, 
which requires the estimation of a standard probit and a linear re-
gression model.  
At a first stage, we estimate a simple probit model of the innova-
tion equation. Using the probit estimates, we calculate the inverse 
Mills ratio for each observation. At a second stage, we compute the 
ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of the cooperation equation 
only for the subsample of uncensored observation. In this final step 
we include the sample selection correction term given by the inverse 
Mills ratio, which is considered as an additional independent vari-
able. 
Table A shows the estimated coefficients which can be compared 
with Table 3. Although the OLS and the ML coefficients are not di-
                                                                                                                
'
1 1 1
'
1 1 1
( )
( )
i
i
i
φλ = x β
Φ x β
 
and 1φ  is the normal density. Accordingly, the cooperation equation reads as fol-
lows 
* *
2 2 2 2i i i iy ρλ υ= + +x β  
where 2iυ is a non systematic, heteroschedastic error term, that is  
*
2 1
2 * 2
2 1
( 0) 0
( 0)
i i
i i i
E y
E y
υ
υ τ
> =
> =  
 
and 2 2 '1 1[1 ( ]i i i iτ ρ λ λ= − + x β . 
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rectly comparable, we observe that the level of significance and the 
sign of the estimated coefficients are similar. The inverse Mills ratio 
coefficients present the same sign of the correlation terms reported in 
Table 3. The key t-value relates to the inverse Mills ratio coefficient, 
which is the relevant parameter to test whether the selection bias is 
significant. This confirms the negative correlation between the unob-
servable components in the selection and outcome equations. 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Table B1: NACE classification codes and definitions  
of sectors included in the scientific group 
NACE 
Rev. 2 
Sector definitions 
19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 
26 Manufacture of computer. electronic and optical prod-ucts  
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles. trailers and semi-trailers  
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment  
61 Telecommunications  
62 Computer programming. consultancy and related ac-tivities 
63 Information service activities  
71 Architectural and engineering activities; technical test-ing and analysis 
72 Scientific research and development  
 
 
 
 
 
 43
 44
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Printed by 
Gi&Gi srl - Triuggio (MB)  
October 2012 
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
DIPARTIMENTO DI DISCIPLINE MATEMATICHE,
FINANZA MATEMATICA ED ECONOMETRIA
VITA E PENSIERO
WORKING PAPER N. 12/3
ISBN 978-88-343-2342-7
Cooperative innovation
Evidence from Italian firms 
Federica Barzi 
Flavia Cortelezzi 
Giovanni Marseguerra 
Maria Grazia Zoia 
COP Barzi.qxd:_  01/10/12  10:38  Page 1
